Professors Richard Samuels, Ken Oye, and Michael Golay shared their insight and uncertainty about Japan’s nuclear crisis at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on March 16, 2011. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants lost essential safety functions in the earthquake and tsunami. The loss of the electricity grid and back up electric power sources means that pumps cannot circulate water to the reactor vessels and the radioactive uranium fuel overheats. Nuclear power plant workers must now rely on improvisation to stabilize cooling at the reactor. The escape of radioactive particles and their dispersal in wind and rain from the damaged power plant threatens the environment and health of Japan’s residents.
The crisis gives insight into the tradeoffs of nuclear technology and Tokyo’s decisions on risk assessments. By 2010, Japan’s enthusiasm for energy independence prioritized a national energy plan with nuclear power. “Nuclear power came to be a greater and greater part of Japan’s nuclear power supply,” said Michael Golay, MIT Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering. The Japanese public expressed ambivalence towards nuclear power, including a not-in-my-backyard attitude. Safety concerns motivated local citizen groups to fight the building of nuclear power plants. Nuclear reactors in Japan are built in clusters at coastal sites outside of the service areas. “As preoccupation with energy security have faded, fears for safety have slowly tipped the scales in Japan.”
Ken Oye, Associate Professor at MIT and Director of the MIT-CIS Program on Political Economy and Technology Policy, experienced the Sendai earthquake while in the relative safety of a bus in a parking lot in Tokyo, Japan. People in Tokyo were “calm, a little bit stunned” and “walking long distances” without available public transportation. Tokyo responded quickly to aid stranded commuters. The situation changed again when Tokyo created “rolling blackouts” to conserve electricity. The sporadic availability of electricity shut down the transportation system and disrupted the supply chain, both great inconveniences. “Japan is a country that depends on mass transit so the net effect of rolling blackouts was a shutdown of the economy,” explained Oye. Overbooked flights had many empty seats because people could not travel to the airport.
Tokyo’s strict seismic building codes and code enforcement saved lives. “First, buildings did not fall down. The glass did not break. It was truly remarkable to see an earthquake of serious proportions without perceived damage,” said Oye.
Oye asked how a country that “performs so beautifully to seismic codes” did not assess the “seismic risk on power plants.” Earthquakes of all magnitudes occur in Japan. Every society must decide how strong of an earthquake nuclear reactors are able to withstand. It is understandable that the Fukushima nuclear reactors were not designed to handle every conceivable earthquake and tsunami. However, risk analysis and assessment for a nuclear power plant should cut covariance for critical components of the backups. For the six nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi site, “the secondary backups were vulnerable to the same components that knocked out the primary,” said Oye.
Tokyo’s “self-correcting” political system had constantly improved the building codes to near perfection. What about improving the safety performance of electricity backups at nuclear reactors?
In past crises, Japan’s nuclear power plants “often covered up problems” and workers “not informed of risk.” That lack of integrity eroded public trust and prevented poor responses. Policymakers in Tokyo did not fully recognize and identify the magnitude of problems at the nuclear power plants. “You don’t respond well when you are lying because you are lying as well to yourself,” said Oye. However, it is difficult to cover up the current nuclear crisis. Oye has received “reasonably straightforward” information about what is going on from his counterparts in Tokyo. Golay has received limited information on the extent of the damage at the nuclear power plants. Uncertainty remains with a lot of unanswered questions.
What kind of hazards are nuclear power plants designed to withstand? Do the problems in Japan reflect a failure of the safety systems, or are plants simply not designed to withstand a magnitude 8.9 earthquake less than 100 miles away?
The crisis gives insight into the tradeoffs of nuclear technology and Tokyo’s decisions on risk assessments. By 2010, Japan’s enthusiasm for energy independence prioritized a national energy plan with nuclear power. “Nuclear power came to be a greater and greater part of Japan’s nuclear power supply,” said Michael Golay, MIT Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering. The Japanese public expressed ambivalence towards nuclear power, including a not-in-my-backyard attitude. Safety concerns motivated local citizen groups to fight the building of nuclear power plants. Nuclear reactors in Japan are built in clusters at coastal sites outside of the service areas. “As preoccupation with energy security have faded, fears for safety have slowly tipped the scales in Japan.”
Ken Oye, Associate Professor at MIT and Director of the MIT-CIS Program on Political Economy and Technology Policy, experienced the Sendai earthquake while in the relative safety of a bus in a parking lot in Tokyo, Japan. People in Tokyo were “calm, a little bit stunned” and “walking long distances” without available public transportation. Tokyo responded quickly to aid stranded commuters. The situation changed again when Tokyo created “rolling blackouts” to conserve electricity. The sporadic availability of electricity shut down the transportation system and disrupted the supply chain, both great inconveniences. “Japan is a country that depends on mass transit so the net effect of rolling blackouts was a shutdown of the economy,” explained Oye. Overbooked flights had many empty seats because people could not travel to the airport.
Tokyo’s strict seismic building codes and code enforcement saved lives. “First, buildings did not fall down. The glass did not break. It was truly remarkable to see an earthquake of serious proportions without perceived damage,” said Oye.
Oye asked how a country that “performs so beautifully to seismic codes” did not assess the “seismic risk on power plants.” Earthquakes of all magnitudes occur in Japan. Every society must decide how strong of an earthquake nuclear reactors are able to withstand. It is understandable that the Fukushima nuclear reactors were not designed to handle every conceivable earthquake and tsunami. However, risk analysis and assessment for a nuclear power plant should cut covariance for critical components of the backups. For the six nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi site, “the secondary backups were vulnerable to the same components that knocked out the primary,” said Oye.
Tokyo’s “self-correcting” political system had constantly improved the building codes to near perfection. What about improving the safety performance of electricity backups at nuclear reactors?
In past crises, Japan’s nuclear power plants “often covered up problems” and workers “not informed of risk.” That lack of integrity eroded public trust and prevented poor responses. Policymakers in Tokyo did not fully recognize and identify the magnitude of problems at the nuclear power plants. “You don’t respond well when you are lying because you are lying as well to yourself,” said Oye. However, it is difficult to cover up the current nuclear crisis. Oye has received “reasonably straightforward” information about what is going on from his counterparts in Tokyo. Golay has received limited information on the extent of the damage at the nuclear power plants. Uncertainty remains with a lot of unanswered questions.
What kind of hazards are nuclear power plants designed to withstand? Do the problems in Japan reflect a failure of the safety systems, or are plants simply not designed to withstand a magnitude 8.9 earthquake less than 100 miles away?